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Background to the study
The use of pay-for-performance, and in particular the use of
incentive schemes has increased dramatically since 1987 in
Fortune 1000 corporations (Lawler, 2003), and in a recent survey
of reward practices conducted by WorldatWork, it was reported
that approximately 66% of companies in the United States use
variable pay beyond their executive levels. This is an increase
from 59% in 1995 (Wilson, 2003). 
Historically, high-performing employees could expect to receive
bigger salary increases than their lower-performing peers,
especially when annual merit increases were averaging higher as
a result of increasing inflation, but today, it has become
increasingly more difficult to differentiate between the salaries
of individual employees based on high or low performance. In
order to supplement these merit increases, many companies have
started implementing pay-for-performance incentive schemes
(Orens and Elliot, 2002).
There is thus globally a trend towards implementing
performance-based incentive schemes, and in particular an
increase in the use of incentive schemes for employees other
than executives. In South Africa, variable pay and in particular
incentive schemes have been implemented successfully for
executives and sales staff across organisations, whereas most
often, middle managers do not reap the benefits of such
incentive programmes.
The focus of this study therefore was to determine what the
current practice is with regard to short-term incentive schemes
for middle managers, as very little empirical research has been
done in this regard. Short-term incentive schemes in
particular are defined as incentive schemes where the
measurement period is around one year and payments are in
cash e.g. profit share, gain share, commission and bonus
scheme (Bussin, 2003). Commission schemes were, however,
excluded from this study as they are mainly used for sales
employees, and a need existed to determine what the
incentive scheme practices are with regard to non-sales middle
management employees.
Middle managers are considered to be those employees at around
the Paterson D-Band level. When looking at a traditional
hierarchical organisation, middle managers are those employees
below senior managerial level and above the supervisory or
junior management level. The professional specialists often fall
into this employee category.
Motivation/rationale for the study 
There is a lack of empirical research and literature on the
problem, and a pressing need in the market exists for this
research. The reasons for focusing on middle managers are that
they are often the group of employees where little emphasis is
placed on the manner in which their rewards are structured. This
research has aimed to address this knowledge gap with specific
reference to the South African market.
Literature on short-term incentive schemes
The literature on short-term incentive schemes is contradictory.
There are proponents as well as sceptics to be found in the
literature. Research has more often than not found that
incentives do not motivate people or have a significant positive
impact on their performance (Kohn, 1993), but it can be argued
that a lack of sufficient rewards or dissatisfaction with the
current reward system does tend to demotivate people and have
a negative effect on their performance (Thorpe & Homan, 2000).
It is thus critical to “get it right” as regards to incentives, as a
shortfall in this area is likely to have negative consequences if
not applied correctly. 
There is ample evidence though that result-based incentive
schemes, especially at the individual level, can greatly increase
company performance (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003). In research
done by Bussin and Huysamen (2004), it was also found that
the short-term incentive policy was also one of the areas that
had the greatest positive impact in private organisations. Short-
term incentives are thus a strong area of focus in organisations,
and specifically when amending the organisation’s
remuneration policy. Bussin and Huysamen (2004) found that
a change in the short-term incentive policy in private;
parastatal and public sector organisations was one of the top
five changes in order of extent of change that changed most in
the remuneration policy. 
There is some research to be found in the literature with regard
to the factors or design principles that need to be taken into
consideration when designing and implementing an incentive
scheme. There is, however, substantial literature available on the
dynamics of executive and sales incentive schemes (Gerhart &
Rynes, 2003), and much research has been published on what is
considered best practice with regard to incentive schemes for
executives and sales employees, but very little research has
focused on middle managers (Scott, McMullen, Wallace &
Morajda, 2004). 
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ABSTRACT
This study aimed to determine what the current practice is with regard to short-term incentive schemes for middle
managers. This was done by means of a quantitative study through a structured research survey completed by a
sample of forty-eight organisations. The design elements, performance measures and payout practices of the various
schemes in use were surveyed, as well as the participants’ view on the perceived effectiveness of their short-term
incentive schemes. Evidence shows that the majority of organisations have a short-term incentive scheme in place
for middle managers, and that the type of scheme used in most of the organisations is a performance-related bonus
scheme, introduced mainly to drive business performance and reward superior performance.
Key words
Incentives schemes, scheme effectiveness, middle management
CURRENT PRACTICE WITH REGARD TO SHORT-TERM
INCENTIVE SCHEMES FOR MIDDLE MANAGERS
45
SA Journal of Human Resource Management, 2007, 5 (1), 45-53
SA Tydskrif vir Menslikehulpbronbestuur, 2007, 5 (1), 45-53
GRIGORIADIS, BUSSIN46
According to Freher (2002), the annual incentive scheme 
has the greatest potential to influence individual 
behaviour and enhance business results. A properly 
designed annual incentive scheme can assist organisations in
achieving the desired performance based on critical tactical
success factors. He is also of the opinion that an individual
manager sees selection to an annual incentive scheme as a 
key step on his/her career ladder, and that participation in
such a scheme has considerable monetary as well as 
symbolic value. He emphasises further though, that a line 
of sight for inclusion into a management incentive
programme is critical. In other words, participation should
only extend to individuals who can truly influence (directly 
or as a significant member of a team) the planned
performance measures. 
Research done by Döckel, Basson and Coetzee (2006) shows
that compensation has a strong significant relation to
organisational commitment – specifically for high-technology
employees. Sutherland (2004) has established in her research
that incentives/bonuses and/or variable pay are the fifth most
important item considered by knowledge workers when
considering to stay or leave their current organisation.
Bloedorn, also (2002) asserts that incentives can expand the
team committed to delivering results and that they can cause
employees, individually and collectively, to focus their
attention on the company’s goals and identify with
shareholder interests. 
The literature encourages organisations to take eligibility for
incentive schemes deeper down into their organisations
(Bloedorn, 2002), but it provides no or very little guidelines to
that effect.
Objectives of the study
The value-add of this research will firstly be theoretical, as it
will influence thinking about short-term incentive schemes,
and will build towards a theory or framework with regard to
short-term incentives for middle managers. Secondly, the value
of this research will be practical in the sense that the research
will highlight the current practices in short-term incentive
schemes, and this will provide organisations with a way
forward with which to implement these schemes at middle
management level. 
It is anticipated that, through this research, organisations 
will be alerted to what the design elements are that make 
up a short-term incentive scheme for middle managers. It
should, however, be pointed out that this research 
has identified certain current practice elements, but it is
critical that when organisations design short-term 
incentive schemes for middle managers that they customise
the incentive scheme to fit their individual business’ needs,
which is what a large organisation did as part of their
becoming one of the best companies to work for (Van Dyk &
Herholdt, 2004).
RESEARCH DESIGN
Research Approach 
This was an empirical study. A quantitative research
methodology was followed and the research was conducted 
by means of a cross-sectional, explorative survey. Survey
research is a method of quantitative research whereby “a
sample of a chosen population can be studied to discover 
the relative incidence, distribution, and interrelations 
of sociological and psychological variables” (Kerlinger & 
Lee, 2000, p. 599). 
In this research a sample of forty eight organisations was studied
with respect to their short-term incentive schemes for middle
management. Survey research is well suited to a problem such as
this, as it is an economical and accurate manner in which a great
deal of information can be gathered from a large population
(Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). 
Research Methodology
Participants/respondents. 
The research questionnaire was sent out to all the organisations
(about five thousand) on the database of a large South African
remuneration consulting firm. 
As this was an existing population being surveyed, the sampling
strategy can be considered to be accidental or convenience
sampling (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000).
Forty-eight organisations participated in this study. The
research questionnaires were completed by the person who is
primarily responsible for the remuneration and reward
management function at each participating organisation. These
respondents were identified as human resources and reward
professionals; CEO’s and finance managers. The research
questionnaire was completed by respondents from a variety of
industry sectors. The classification and definition of the
industry sectors used were those normally used by the
remuneration consultancy whose database of organisations was
surveyed. The industry sectors of the participating
organisations can be seen in Table 1.
TABLE 1
PARTICIPATING ORGANISATIONS: INDUSTRY SECTOR
Industry Sector Percentage of Participants
Producer Services 27%
Transformative 23%
Distributive Services 17%
Other (mostly Information Technology) 13%
Social Services 10%
Extractive 8%
Personal Services 2%
The largest group of the participating organisations is in the
producer services sector, which are typically organisations in
banking and financial services; insurance; real estate;
engineering; accounting; consulting; legal services; and
miscellaneous business services. 
The workforce size of the various participating organisations can
be seen in Table 2. 
TABLE 2
PARTICIPATING ORGANISATIONS: WORKFORCE SIZE
Industry Sector Percentage of Participants
Less than 150 17%
150 – 500 25%
501 – 2000 25%
2001 – 10 000 23%
10 001 plus 10%
The range of the workforce size of the participating
organisations is quite wide, as it includes both very large 
and quite small organisations. In Table 3, the descriptive
statistics relating to the various organisations’ workforce sizes
can be viewed.
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TABLE 3
PARTICIPATING ORGANISATIONS: 
WORKFORCE SIZE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Descriptive Statistic Value
Mean 3797
Median/50th Percentile 1164
Standard Deviation 7446
Minimum 32
Maximum 42769
Range 42737
25th Percentile 223
75th Percentile 3269
Skewness 3,65
Kurtosis 16,1
Measuring instrument/methods of data gathering. 
The measuring instrument used in this study was a structured
research questionnaire. A suitable questionnaire was
developed and then piloted with a small sample of reward
experts and academics before being sent out to the research
participants. 
Job evaluation correlation tables were included in the
questionnaires to participants; to allow the participants to
complete the questionnaire with reference to the correct
employee group. It was made clear that the category of staff this
research applied to was middle managers.
The questionnaire contained both factual items exploring the
short-term incentive schemes in use by organisations, as well as
perceived- effectiveness questions. The basis for these perceived
effectiveness questions were aspects that are usually considered
by remuneration professionals as important in establishing the
effectiveness of their schemes. A Likert scale was used for these
questions. A Likert scale is also known as a summative rating
scale that requires the respondent to respond to several
statements that are clearly favourable or unfavourable
concerning the topic being measured (Elmes, Kantowitz &
Roediger III, 1999). 
Open-ended questions were also included in the questionnaire
to generate authentic responses from participants. Data from the
questionnaires was further supplemented by follow-up
telephonic interviews where necessary, to enhance the quality of
the data collected.
Statistical analysis/treatment of the data. 
The response data from the questionnaires circulated was the
source for data analysis, as well as any follow-up telephonic
interviews. Descriptive statistics are the primary method by
which the factual data is portrayed. This reflects the research
results visually, and is a suitable method of data analysis, as the
sample of research participants is limited.
A secondary analysis was done on the participating
organisations’ size and industry sector, to determine 
whether there was in fact a relationship between the
participating organisations’ biographical data and the various
elements researched in the survey. No significant trends 
were however found between the participating organisa-
tions’ biographical data and the other elements researched 
in this survey. 
Where there was an opportunity to provide a free-text response,
these responses were examined to establish the similarities to
responses provided by other participants. These responses were
used in determining common areas of difficulties experienced
by organisations, and common areas of advice for other
organisations about to embark on the use of short-term
incentive schemes for their middle managers.
RESULTS
The specific areas explored by this survey were short-
term incentive schemes in use by the participating
organisations at middle management level with respect to 
the design elements, performance measures, payout 
practices as well as the effectiveness of these schemes as
perceived by the respondents.
Of the forty eight organisations surveyed, 77% indicated 
that they had a short-term incentive scheme in place for 
their middle managers, while 23% of the respondents had 
no such scheme in place. The organisations that did not have 
a short-term incentive scheme in place were questioned 
about their reasons for not having such a scheme. Table 4
reflects their responses.
TABLE 4
REASONS WHY PARTICIPATING ORGANISATIONS DO NOT HAVE A
SHORT-TERM INCENTIVE SCHEME FOR MIDDLE MANAGERS
Reasons for not introducing a scheme Percentage
The organisation has considered it, and we will start 55%
implementing short-term incentive schemes for middle 
managers in the near future
Other (more information is required on incentive schemes, 27%
and there are limited resources to implement these schemes)
There is no need for short-term incentive schemes for middle 9%
managers in our organisation
The organisation uses other reward/recognition schemes to 9%
incentivise our middle managers
More than half the organisations have considered implementing
short-term incentive schemes and may start implementing them
for middle managers in the near future. The organisations that
do have a short-term incentive scheme in place for their middle
managers were asked to indicate what the reasons were that they
considered in introducing the scheme. Their responses are
reflected in Table 5.
TABLE 5
REASONS FOR INTRODUCING A SHORT-TERM INCENTIVE SCHEME
FOR MIDDLE MANAGERS
Reasons for introducing the STI Percentage of respondents who 
agreed with the statement 
To drive business performance 97,3%
To reward superior performance 91,9%
To improve employee motivation 78,4%
To increase retention 70,3%
To drive business strategy 64,9%
To communicate goals and objectives 44,4%
To share wealth 43,2%
To address a particular business issue 29,7%
The two main reasons for introducing a short-term incentive
scheme at middle management level are to drive business
performance, and to reward superior performance.
Of the 77% of participants that have a short-term incentive
scheme in place, the majority (89%) of organisations have only
one short-term incentive scheme in place for their middle
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managers, while only 11% have two schemes in place. As regards
the type of scheme the organisation used, the results are
reflected in Table 6.
TABLE 6
TYPES OF SHORT-TERM INCENTIVE SCHEME USED
BY PARTICIPATING ORGANISATIONS
Type of scheme in use Percentage of organisations using the particular 
short-term incentive scheme
Bonus Scheme 84%
Profit-sharing Scheme 14%
Gain-sharing Scheme 3%
Other STI 8%
The definitions of these short term incentive schemes 
were provided in the questionnaires and are the defini-
tions normally used by the remuneration consultancy 
whose database of organisations was surveyed. Bonus 
schemes are defined as usually having between 4 and 7
measures which are carefully chosen to drive business strategy.
These targets are typically quantitative and qualitative in
nature and are usually expressed as threshold (budget), target
and stretch target.
Gainsharing is typically a company wide, formula based
scheme for lower level staff aimed primarily at improving
productivity. It differs from profit sharing in that it has
measures and employees lower down can control and 
exclude items in the income statement like tax, deprecia-
tion, bad debt and other economic factors that might
influence profit. In a Profit share scheme, the bonus is 
a predetermined percentage of the organisation’s profits,
usually also dependant on the achievement of other 
objectives as well.
Only the data for the participants using bonus schemes will be
reported in this article. There are very few organisations using
profit-sharing (14%); gain-sharing (3%), and other short-term
incentive schemes (8%).
Eligibility
In most cases, all the middle managers in the organisations
were eligible to participate in the scheme. Twenty two per cent
of organisations involved the eligible employees in the design
and development of the scheme, and where the eligible
employees fell under a bargaining unit, only 14% of
organisations involved key stakeholders from the bargaining
unit in the development and design of the scheme. Where
eligible employees were however involved, this happened
mostly through a committee or forum where some of the
eligible employees would be present. This is a significant
finding, as it is critical to the success of the scheme to involve
eligible employees in the design of the scheme (Thorpe &
Homan, 2000).
Responsibilities with regard to short-term incentive schemes
Participating organisations were questioned as to who the
primary person(s) are who is (are) responsible for the design;
initial implementation; communication; administration and
reviewing of their short-term incentive schemes. The results as
displayed in Table 7 are applicable to bonus schemes only, as this
is the scheme which 84% of the organisations have in place in
their organisations.
From Table 7, it is clear that many of the responsibilities relating
to the design elements of short-term incentives are largely
Human Resources and Remuneration responsibilities.
Forty seven percent of organisations review their bonus scheme
once a year and 44% review the scheme as and when required.
Fifty nine percent of respondents have had the bonus schemes in
their organisations in existence for longer than three years. 
Performance measures
As can be seen in Table 8, sixty percent of responding
organisations use between three and five performance criteria
or performance measures in their bonus scheme. They have
indicated that the nature of these performance criteria can be
quantitative, qualitative, financial, or non-financial, although
in the majority of cases a financial measurement is involved.
The number and type of performance measures used in 
a scheme is significant as this influences the middle 
manager’s ability to achieve these targets and receive a 
payout (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003), (Pfeffer and Sutton, 2006)
and (Freher, 2002).
TABLE 8
NUMBER OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES THAT NEED TO BE MET,
BEFORE A PAYOUT CAN BE MADE
Average number of measures Percentage of respondents having this 
in bonus scheme number of measures in their scheme
0 3%
1 10%
2 10%
3 20%
4 33%
5 7%
6 3%
8 3%
9 3%
11 3%
12 3%
Grand Total 100%
TABLE 7
RESPONSIBLE PERSON(S) FOR THE VARIOUS DESIGN
ELEMENTS IN A BONUS SCHEME
Bonus Scheme design Remuneration Human Line Management Finance Remuneration CEO Other (Committee Other 
elements Manager Resources Consultants of Remuneration; (Remco and 
HR and Line Board)
Development and design 22% 13% - - 9% 27% 16% 13%
Initial implementation 34% 28% 13% 6% 3% - 16% -
Communication 22% 34% 16% 3% - 13% 12% -
Day-to-day Administration 22% 46% 13% 13% - - 6% -
Reviewing the scheme 37% 16% - 3% 3% 19% 6% 16%
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In 59% of the cases, these performance criteria are set by the top
management of the organisation, followed by the departmental
manager in conjunction with the individual employee (22%).
The primary method by which compliance with these
performance criteria is measured is by means of a performance
management system (69%).
In 88% of the organisations, a certain performance criterion,
referred to as a trigger, needs to be met first before the bonus
scheme can pay out. This is usually the financial performance
of the company, followed by the requirement that the
individual employee and the department must achieve certain
performance goals.
Payouts on the scheme
The payouts in the bonus scheme are funded from the
organisation budget. Payout on the scheme is, however, not
guaranteed as certain performance measures need to be achieved
first. Sixty nine per cent of organisations using a bonus scheme
have indicated that these schemes pay out once a year. 
Participants were questioned about the various proportions
that certain performance measures contribute towards a 
100% payout on the bonus scheme. The ranges in each 
group of performance measures ranged from 0% -100% 
for each category, and the ranges where the majority of
participants responded, are indicated in Table 9. Due to 
the wide range of responses reflected, the results should 
be interpreted with care.
TABLE 9
PROPORTIONAL CONTRIBUTION OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES
TOWARDS PAYOUT ON A BONUS SCHEME
Type of performance Proportional Percentage of 
measures contribution towards respondents who 
a 100% payout on indicated in this 
the scheme range
Group wide/organisation measures 20% - 50% 38%
Business unit/division measures 25% - 40% 64%
Individual performance measures 30% - 60% 70%
There is thus a heavier proportional contribution of individual
performance measures, than group wide or organisation
measures at middle management level. The line of sight for
middle managers to contribute towards the organisational
success measures, e.g. profit is less than it might be for senior
executives. The individual performance measures are thus more
heavily weighted as these can be influenced directly by the
middle managers.
Seventy five per cent of organisations cap their payout in 
the bonus scheme at a certain percentage or amount.
Participants were requested to supply actual payout figures 
for 2004, 2005 and 2006. Due to the wide range of 
responses (from 0% - 200% of the individual employee’s
guaranteed annual package), the median payouts were
calculated. The results are depicted in Table 10, and should
again be interpreted with care.
TABLE 10
PAYOUTS OF BOUNS SCHEMES IN 2004-2006
2004 2005 2006
Median payout per year as a % of 12% 11% 9%
total guaranteed package
Mean payout per year as a % of total 30% 28% 18%
guaranteed package
Ranges of payouts per year as a % 0%-200% 4%-87% 0%-115%
of total guaranteed package
Perceived effectiveness dimensions
The participants were requested to rate twenty perceived
effectiveness dimensions with regard to the short-
term incentive schemes in their organisations on a Likert 
scale that ranged from strongly disagree (1), to strongly 
agree (5). They were requested to respond as to how 
they currently perceive the scheme. The mean responses 
were also calculated. 
A reliability statistic of Chronbach’s Alpha was calculated at
0,901. Chronbach’s Alpha is used to assess the internal
consistency reliability of an instrument that has different
scoring and response scales, such as a Likert Scale (Kerlinger &
Lee, 2000). The instrument used here to assess the perceived
effectiveness of short-term incentive schemes thus has a high
internal consistency. The instrument is reliable, and the items
can be considered homogeneous.
The actual percentage of the participants’ responses to the
significant items on the scale is reflected in Table 11, and is
sorted according to the highest mean responses.
Common difficulties experienced with the schemes, and
advice to organisations about to embark on the
implementation of short-term incentive schemes
Participants were asked to indicate what difficulties they were
currently experiencing with their short-term incentive schemes
in their respective organisations. Their responses were free-text
to encourage authentic responses. Some of the responses are
summarised in Table 12.
Finally, participants were questioned as to what they would
recommend to organisations about to embark on a short-term
incentive scheme. Some of their responses, which were free-text,
are summarised in Table 13.
The participating organisations seem to experience common
areas of difficulties when implementing short-term incentive
schemes and their advice to other organisations concern the
prevention of some of the difficulties that they themselves have
experienced.
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TABLE 12
COMMON DIFFICULTIES EXPERIENCED WITH
SHORT-TERM INCENTIVE SCHEMES
Benchmarking and obtaining accurate competitor information
Developing and determining objective performance criteria or measures, and
having an objective performance management system – which is a
prerequisite for an incentive scheme
Determining the weighting of company; team and the individual
performance measures
The limited funds available, that in turn prohibit the payment of a bonus
Even though bonuses aren’t guaranteed, employees start to see them as a
13th cheque (something they are entitled to) – they therefore do not want to
have to perform to earn a bonus
It is very hard to give the “bad news” when there is no bonus
Participating employees perceive the scheme as being subjective and unfair,
and they don’t trust the scheme
The scheme is often poorly communicated 
Line managers don’t understand the scheme
TABLE 13
ADVICE TO ORGANISATIONS ABOUT TO EMBARK ON SHORT-TERM
INCENTIVE SCHEMES
Do a proper benchmarking and analysis
Obtain board and CEO buy-in (also line manager buy-in)
Consultation with participating employees (focus groups) to get their buy-in
Ensure that a proper performance management system is in place and that it
is applied consistently 
Have clear rules that are properly communicated and consistently applied
Get the performance measures in the scheme right and hold firm onto them.
Don’t keep moving the goalposts. The scheme will lose its credibility 
Communicate performance regularly during the assessment period
Be clear about what behaviours you are incentivising, as you may get what
you pay for
Keep it simple. Use the scheme as a reward system and not as a system to
manage the business
Tailor-make incentives (allow for flexibility and choice)
Be transparent in the allocation process
Consider having a moderation process in place
Track consistency and fairness of the system
DISCUSSION
This study aimed to determine the short-term incentive
practices at middle management level with regard to the type of
schemes used, their design elements, performance measures and
payout practices. Their perceived effectiveness by the
respondents was also measured.
The move towards implementing short-term incentive schemes
for middle managers is gaining popularity as 77% of the
organisations surveyed already had at least one such scheme in
place. Of the other 23% of the organisations that do not have a
short-term incentive scheme in place, 55% cited that they have
considered it and that they may start implementing short-term
incentive schemes in the near future. 
The two main reasons for introducing short-term incentive
schemes for middle management, as reflected in Table 5, are to
drive business performance (97%) and to reward superior
performance (91.9%). A total of 78.4% of organisations also
introduced the scheme to improve employee motivation. This is
a large and convincing number of participants. 
A recent similar study conducted in the United Kingdom reports
that only 31% of respondents indicated that they introduced the
scheme to “motivate & incentivise staff” (Armstrong &
Thompson, 2006, p.26). In another survey of a similar nature
conducted in the United States of America, the primary objective
of the variable pay programme was to improve organisation or
team financial performance (65% of respondents) (Scott;
Mcmullan; Wallace and Moradja, 2004). It appears as though we
are being influenced more by the American school of thought
than by the British.
Even though the literature has on numerous occasions indicated
that it is critical to the success of the scheme to involve eligible
employees in the design of the scheme (Thorpe & Homan, 2000)
and to increase ownership and acceptance of the scheme
(Armstrong, 2002), only 22% of the participants in this survey
involve their eligible employees in the development and design
TABLE 11
PERCEIVED EFFECTIVENESS OF SHORT-TERM INCENTIVE SCHEMES
Item Mean Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Agree Strongly Agree
Response Disagree nor Disagree
The scheme has a positive influence on individual performance 3,92 2,8% 8,3% 5,6% 61,1% 22,2%
targets and goals
The scheme has a positive influence on company/organisation 3,89 2,8% 5,6% 8,3% 66,7% 16,7%
performance targets and goals
The scheme drives positive behavioural performance 3,61 2,8% 8,3% 22,2% 58,3% 8,3%
The scheme results in an increase in employee morale over the long 3,61 2,8% 8,3% 22,2% 58,3% 8,3%
term (4 months +)
The scheme is effective in motivating participating employees to 3,61 2,8% 8,3% 22,2% 58,3% 8,3%
reach the required performance measures
The participating employees buy- into the scheme 3,61 2,8% 8,3% 22,2% 58,3% 8,3%
The current performance management system supports the short- 3,61 5,6% 22,2% 2,8% 44,4% 25,0%
term incentive scheme
Employees feel that they can achieve the performance measures 3,5 5,6% 8,3% 19,4% 63,9% 2,8%
that have been set
The short-term incentive scheme is able to differentiate significantly 3,5 8,3% 19,4% 13,9% 30,6% 27,8%
between poor performing and high-performing employees
The participating employees have no disputes with regard to the scheme 3,44 0,0% 19,4% 25,0% 47,2% 8,3%
The employees who participate in the scheme experience the 3,36 0,0% 22,2% 27,8% 41,7% 8,3%
scheme positively
The scheme results in an increase in employee morale over the 3,36 0,0% 22,2% 27,8% 41,7% 8,3%
short term (1- 3 months)
The participating employees perceive the scheme as fair 3,36 0,0% 22,2% 27,8% 41,7% 8,3%
The scheme results in increased teamwork amongst participating 3,36 0,0% 16,7% 36,1% 41,7% 5,6%
employees
It is relatively easy to set performance measures for the scheme 3,33 2,8% 16,7% 33,3% 38,9% 8,3%
The short-term incentive scheme is able to create sufficient wealth 3,22 13,9% 16,7% 16,7% 38,9% 13,9%
for high performing employees
The scheme serves as an effective retention tool 3,14 5,6% 22,2% 30,6% 36,1% 5,6%
The scheme attracts high talent for the organisation 3,08 5,6% 22,2% 38,9% 25,0% 8,3%
Participation in the scheme leads to unhealthy competition among the 2,22 22,2% 44,4% 22,2% 11,1% 0,0%
participating employees
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of the scheme. This lack of involvement may lead to a lack of
trust between management and employees, and Gerhart & Rynes
(2003) indicate that these schemes may well be undermined as a
result of this lack of trust.
This lack of involvement, however, does not seem to be a factor
of major concern to the participants as reflected in Table 11, as
50% of participants believe that the participating employees
experience the scheme positively; 52% believe that
participating employees perceive the scheme as being fair,
63.9% believe that the participating employees buy into the
scheme; and 55.5% believe that the participating employees
have no disputes with regard to the scheme. This is however the
perception of the participating organisations and not the
employees themselves.
This research found that a convincing number of respondents
participate in bonus schemes as their scheme of choice (84%),
and that they also believe this is the most effective scheme for
middle managers.
As Table 7 indicates, the function responsible for the design,
implementation, communication and administration of bonus
schemes is still largely a human resources and remuneration
function. Very few respondents indicated that line management
was responsible for the implementation (13%), communication
(16%) and day-to-day administration (13%) of the bonus scheme,
yet they also indicated (Table 12) that a common difficulty
experienced with the scheme is that line managers do not
understand the scheme.
This, according to Beer and Canon (2004) can result in
significant problems with implementation of the scheme that is
often insufficiently acknowledged by practitioners.
Organisations often underestimate the time and effort that need
to be consumed by managers to implement and administer a
new variable pay system (Cox, 2005).
Armstrong (2002) is of the opinion that an important element in
the ideal performance-related pay model is that the
responsibility and ‘ownership’ of the system should be assigned
to line managers. Organisations should therefore consider
educating their line managers to be able to understand these
schemes and in turn to be able to set effective, clear and fair
performance measures, and as a result, they must be able to
differentiate successfully between the high- and poor-
performing employees reporting into them. 
Performance measures and the performance management
system
Even though the most preferred performance measures are
financial in nature, the participants indicated that they use
quantitative, qualitative, financial, or non-financial
performance measures. A combination of these is ideal for
middle managers, as their ability to influence financial targets is
more limited than that of the executives in their organisations.
If the measures are perceived to be too far removed for
individual employees to influence, the scheme’s effectiveness is
questionable (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003). 
As a result, middle managers and professionals are often also
measured by “softer” and more qualitative performance
measures (Thorpe & Homan, 2000). Nevertheless, it is critical
that incentive scheme performance measures shouldn’t be too
complex or difficult for the participants to understand and
influence (Pfeffer and Sutton, 2006), and that a line-of-sight
relationship must exist between the participants and the
scheme’s performance measures (Freher, 2002).
The literature is divided as regards the number of performance
measures that should be used in a bonus scheme, but it is
interesting to find that 60% of responding organisations in this
study have between three and five performance measures that
need to be achieved first before a payout can be made from the
bonus scheme. This is a good number of measures to use. Not
too many not to be able to achieve the targets, and not too few
to make the achievement of targets too easy. 
Participants responded mostly neutral as to the ease of setting
accurate performance measures. However, 66.6% believe that the
participating employees feel that they can achieve the
performance measures that have been set. This is, however, the
opinion of the respondents in this survey, and not that of the
participating employees themselves.
The primary method by which these performance measures are
measured is by means of a performance management system
(69%). Reliable performance data is thus a “must have” for
variable pay programmes to work (Orens and Elliott, 2002).
Care should be taken during the performance assessment, as
not to use subjectivity (Thorpe & Homan, 2000). A total of
69.4% of respondents in the survey believe that the current
performance management system supports the short-term
incentive scheme.
Payouts in the bonus scheme
In 88% of the organisations, a certain performance hurdle or
moderating factor, often called a trigger, needs to be achieved
first before the bonus scheme can pay out. This is usually the
financial performance of the company, followed by the
individual employee and the department achieving certain
performance goals.
Slightly more than half (58.4%) of respondents (Table 11),
believe that the current incentive scheme is able to differentiate
significantly between high and low performers. This is not ideal,
as one of the main reasons to introduce a bonus scheme is to
differentiate between high and low performers (Orens and
Elliot, 2002).
Participants are divided in response to the question of whether
the scheme is able to create sufficient wealth for high-
performing employees. Rynes, Gerhart and Minette (2004) are
of the opinion that the aspect of pay that will most directly
motivate performance will be the extent to which pay is
contingent on performance. I.e. if there is no real differentiation
in pay-for-performance between high and low performers, there
will be no real differentiation in their performance. The
converse is also true. When pay is sharply differentiated on the
basis of performance, pay is a very effective motivator indeed. 
As Table 9 indicates, the majority of participants in this research
use three different groups of performance measures where
individual performance measures count more than group wide
measures towards a hundred percent payout on the scheme. This
is concurrent with Freher’s (2002) recommendations that the
scheme should have a proper balance among corporate, business
unit, and individual performance.
This is also indicative of the line-of-sight principle, in that
middle managers will have more influence over their own and
their department’s performance than the company’s
performance. It makes sense though that the company
performance measure also counts towards the bonus payout, as
the company needs to be performing before a performance
bonus can be paid out in any event.
The influence of short-term incentive schemes on
performance, motivation and retention of middle managers
A total of 83.3% of respondents in this survey believe that the
short-term incentive scheme has a positive influence on
individual performance, and 83,4% believe the scheme will
positively influence company performance. This corresponds to
Gerhart & Rynes’ (2003) suggestion that there is ample evidence
that results-based incentive plans can greatly increase
performance. Incentives can only spark motivation if employees
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have enough information to work effectively and if other
organisational systems and technologies are not main
roadblocks to performance (Pfeffer and Sutton, 2006). 
Seventy eight per cent of respondents in the survey introduced a
short-term incentive scheme to improve employee motivation
and 72.2 % believe that the scheme actually motivates the
employees to reach the required performance standards. 
Participants are divided in their beliefs as to whether the scheme
acts as an effective retention tool or whether the scheme is able
to attract high talent to the organisation.
A framework for short-term incentive schemes in 
South Africa
An objective of this study was to build towards a framework of
current practice with regard to short-term incentive schemes
for middle managers, to be able to assist remuneration
practitioners in organisations. To this effect, a summary of the
results of this study is indicated in Table 14 for short-term
incentive schemes in general, and in Table 15 for bonus
schemes in particular.
TABLE 14
COMMON DESIGN ELEMENTS REGARDING SHORT-TERM INCENTIVE
SCHEMES FOR MIDDLE MANAGERS IN SOUTH AFRICA
Design element Summary of survey responses
The prevalence of using short-term 77% of organisations surveyed use a 
incentive schemes for middle short-term incentive scheme for their 
managers middle managers
Reasons for introducing a short- To drive business performance, and to 
term incentive scheme reward superior performance
Eligibility to participate in the All employees at middle management 
schemes level
Involvement of participating Very little or none at all
employees
Most commonly used scheme Bonus scheme
TABLE 15
COMMON DESIGN ELEMENTS REGARDING BONUS SHEMES FOR MIDDLE
MANAGERS IN SOUTH AFRICA
Design Element Survey Responses Summary
Responsibility for development CEO and remuneration manager
and design of bonus scheme
Responsibility for initial Remuneration manager and human 
implementation of bonus scheme resources
Responsibility for communicating Human resources and the 
the scheme remuneration manager
Responsibility for day-to-day Human resources
administration of scheme
Responsibility for reviewing the Remuneration manager
scheme
How regularly the scheme needs Once a year, or when required
to be reviewed
The number of performance 
measures in the bonus scheme 3 - 5
Responsibility for setting the main Top management, followed by the 
performance measures individual employee in conjunction
with department and line management
How these performance measures Performance management system
are measured
Funding of the scheme Budgeted for
The use of triggers or moderators Company, division and individual 
before a payout can be made targets need to be achieved 
Frequency of payouts Once a year
As 84% of the participating organisations use a bonus scheme
for their middle managers, the common design elements
regarding bonus schemes only are summarised in Table 15.
Validity and reliability of the study
Although this study surveyed a relatively small sample of
organisations, the size and sectors of the organisations surveyed
are quite broad. The results are able to provide the reader with a
perspective on what the current practices are with regard to
short-term incentive schemes for middle managers. This is the
first empirical study of this nature in South Africa, and the
reliability of the results can be increased by replicating the study
with a larger sample of organisations.
Limitations of this research
This study aimed to determine the practices with regard to
short-term incentive schemes for middle managers. The 
middle manager category is quite broad, and with hindsight, 
it would have been more valuable had the individual sub-
grade categories been surveyed. It was hoped that the 
different organisation sectors and organisation sizes would
have significantly different practices with regard to their short-
term incentive schemes, however, no significant differences
were found. 
Value-add of this study
This study has added significant value to the practice and
perceptions of short-term incentive schemes for middle
managers. Readers have an idea as to how other professionals in
charge of these schemes experience their effectiveness, and they
now have a guide with regard to the design elements/features
that are inherent in short-term incentive schemes. Consulting
organisations have conducted some surveys to determine certain
elements of short-term incentive schemes. However, these were
never empirical studies, and they didn’t focus on middle
managers specifically. It is hoped that this research has added to
the broad body of knowledge about remuneration and reward
management in South Africa.
Suggestions for future research
In this research, the participating organisations were asked to
rate their perceived effectiveness of the schemes. It would be
ideal if this research could be done where the participating
employees themselves are asked to rate their perceived
effectiveness of the scheme. Armstrong (2002) also recommends
that organisations have the effectiveness of their performance-
related pay programmes evaluated by the people participating in
the scheme. He advises, however, that the organisation should be
prepared to take action based on these results. 
Another suggestion for future research is to determine whether
incentive schemes actually achieve the results that they were
introduced for in the first place in organisations, namely to drive
business performance; reward superior performance and
improve employee motivation.
It would also be beneficial if future researchers could test the
hypothesis of whether a lack of involvement by eligible
employees in the development and design of bonus schemes
actually leads to a lack of trust between eligible employees and
the management of the organisation, and whether this has a
negative effect on the scheme. The development of an
effectiveness measure would also be very useful, where all the
relevant effectiveness dimensions are surveyed, and some sort of
standardised scoring mechanism can be used.
Conclusion
Short-term incentive schemes for middle managers is a vehicle
that is mostly used to increase and reward superior
performance. Only some of the participating organisations
experience these schemes as effective in achieving the aims of
the schemes. The most popular scheme to use at middle
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management level is a bonus scheme where there is a
combination of individual; team and organisation-wide
performance measures that contribute towards a payout on the
scheme. The participating organisations in this research,
however, still experience some difficulties when implementing
these schemes. South African organisations should in future
allocate significant time and effort to the planning and design
of these schemes, and ensure that the majority of employees
and line managers buy into the scheme and perceive the scheme
as fair. The buy-in from both employees and line managers is
critical if these schemes are going to succeed into future, and
have the effect desired by organisations.
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